Strategic Management and the Internal Organization of Food Marketing Firms by Rogers, Richard T. & Caswell, Julie A.
£eR~ATE  STRATEGIES,  PUBLIC  POLICIES 
& FOOD  SYSTEM  PERFORMANCfu 
STRATEGIC  MANAGEMENT  AND  THE  INTERNAL 
ORGANIZATION  OF  FOOD  MARKETING  FIRMS 
by 
Richard T.  Rogers  and Julie A.  Caswell 
WP-l  September  1987 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 
Jfil> 
A Joint USDA Land Grant University Research Project 
'","'01  . ...  _ STRATEGIC  MANAGEMENT  AND  THE  INTERNAL 
ORGANIZATION  OF  FOOD  MARKETING  FIRMS 
by 
Richard  T.  Rogers  and Julie A.  Caswell 
WP-l  September  1987 
This  paper was  originally presented in a  symposium  on  Emerging  Issues 
and  Research Needs  in the  Food  System held at the Northeastern Agricul-
tural and Resource  Economics  Association meetings,  Morgantown,  West 
Virginia,  June  1986. 
The  authors  are assistant professors,  Department of Agricultural  and 
Resource  Economics,  University of Massachusetts at Amherst. Strategic Management  and  the  Internal Organization 
of Food Marketing  Firms 
Research  on  the post-farm food  distribution system requires  more  tools 
than are  commonly  found  in the  economist's neoclassical  toolkit.  Neoclassical 
theory is well-defined at either end of the  competitive  spectrum but  the  bulk 
of  food distribution activity takes place  somewhere  between  those  extremes . 
The  competitive  model  has  served the agricultural  economics  profession well 
largely because  the profession's main  interests have  centered on  the  farm 
enterprise.  Ignoring  government  involvement,  the  farm  sector complies,  as 
well  as  any  in the  economy,  with  the conditions  of the  competitive model  since 
it is characterized by  numerous  small operators  producing homogeneous  products 
in markets  with relatively easy entry.  The  food distribution sector,  however, 
is characterized by  a  bimodal  structure.  For  example,  although  there are  over 
17,000  food  manufacturers  in the  country,  the  top  20  firms  control nearly  30 
percent of the  sector's value-added.  While  neoclassical  theory  treats all 
firms  as  homogeneous  except for  scale,  firms  engaged in food distribution are 
heterogenous  and  compete  in many  ways  other  than price.  To  understand the 
food  distribution system  requires  expanding  the  economist's  toolkit  to  include 
non-price competition,  business  case studies,  behavioral  theories  of the  firm, 
and  the  new  research,  both theoretical  and empirical,  on strategic management. 
Major  research efforts by agricultural economists  over  the past  two 
decades  reported in National  Commission  on Food Marketingl ,  Connor et al. 2 , 
and Marion3  have  yielded  a  detailed description and extensive analysis  of  the 
organization of  the  post-harvest food  system in the United States.  Much  is 
known  about  the  structure of the  food  industries  and  that structure's 
relationship  to  several measures  (some  controversial)  of economic  performance. 
1 Like  traditional microeconomic  theory,  however,  this fruitful body  of work has 
treated the  firm  as  a  black box  that  somehow  connects  market  structure with 
performance. 
At  this  juncture,  the  major  research  need in studying  the  evolution of 
the  food  system is  the  development  of what  Leibenstein4  refers  to  as  a 
micro-microeconomic  theory of the  firm.  How  do  agribusiness  firms,  and 
particularly the  large marketing firms  that increasingly dominate  the  sector, 
make  strategic decisions  to  enter,  expand  in,  or exit specific market 
segments?  Once  strategic decisions  have been made ,  how  does  the  firm organize 
itself to  carry out  those  decisions?  How  does  the  internal organization of 
firms  affect both  company  and  economy  wide  performance?  Strategic management 
and  internal firm organization are major  emerging  issues  in food  system 
research because  these choices,  in themselves  and as  responses  to  changes  in 
the  firm's environment  and  opportunity set,  are at the heart of dynamic  change 
in  the  system. 
Strategic Management  as  a  Research  Paradigm 
Strategic management  has  been  a  hot  topic  in business circles  f or  at 
least a  decade.  Strategic management  is not really new  in that it refers  to 
the  firm's  process  of developing  and  implementing  a  plan for  success  in the 
marketplace.  Its  importance has  grown,  at least in part,  because  more 
strategies are available  to  firms.  In perfect competition  the  firm has  no 
strategic choice.  The  pricing decision is eliminated since all surviving 
firms  charge  the  prevailing price,  produce  where  marginal  revenue  equals 
marginal  cost,  and refrain from  individual advertising.  As  markets  depart 
2 from  the  competitive  model,  firms  may  choose  differing  strategies  regarding 
such key  decisions  as  price and product  differ ent i ation.  Of  course,  the 
rewards  vary with  each strategy and  success  is uncer tain.  But  such 
variability and uncertainty is  the risk that  crea t es  the  f i nancial incentive 
to  engage  in str ategic management. 
Despite  the  connection between  economic  theory  and stra t egic  management, 
the  fields  remain  somewhat  separated.  All business  school  students  take 
economic  theory courses but many  wonder  why  since little of the  subject 
material is directly applicable  to  their main  interest--the running of a 
business  firm .  Such  questioning is understandable because  the  black  box 
treatment of the  firm  in neoclassical  theory does  say little about  the  actual 
operation of a  firm.  The  only major behavioral assumption used is that  f i r ms 
maximize profits.  Homogeneous  except  for  scale,  firms  are left  t o  select the 
input levels  required to produce  the profit maximizing  output  l evel given 
known prices.  The  theory does  not  explain how  firms  grow,  which  is of vital 
interest to business  managers ,  or recognize  that firms  may  seek  t o  maximize 
growth or sales  rather  than profits.  Such differences  of focus  stern  l argely 
from  the differing objectives of business  management  and  economi cs.  Business 
policy is concerned with the heterogeneity of firms  and how  t o  best manage 
their different resource bundles .  Neoclassical  economic  theory,  on  the  other 
hand,  tries t9  provide  a  general understanding of resource allocation  in a 
freely operating price  system.  It is  feared  that incorporating  the rich 
detail of business heterogeneity  into  economic  theory would  blur observations 
on  the essential workings  of the price allocat ion syst em.  Good  theory  needs 
simplifying assumptions  and  to criticize neoclassical  theory because it 
assumes  away  too  much  of reality is not  appr opria t e .  However,  managers  need 
3 guidance  for  decision making  and  economics  can provide  an  important 
foundation. 
Industrial Organization economics  (10)  emerged as  a  branch of 
microeconomics  that stresses greater  realism by  recognizing  increasing 
departures  from  the  competitive  model.  Initially this  realism  came  at the 
expense  of theoretical rigor.  The  branch began with  a  call for  case studies 
of industries with diverse  structures  to uncover universal truths  linking 
market  structure to market performance.  When  generalizable truths did not 
become  apparent,  10  research turned to  the  cross-sectional  industry and  firm 
studies  that have  marked  the majority of the last 20  years'  work.  The  current 
research effort incorporates  more  advanced  theory with empirical modeling  of 
individual  industries.  Such  models  are often able  to  capture  some  aspects  of 
firm heterogeneity.  The  cumulative  research to  date has  supported the basic 
10  paradigm relating market  structure  to market performance but controversy 
remains  over  interpretation of  the  findings.  Chicago  school  economists still 
question whether  the  relationship between concentration and profits,  for 
example,  demonstrates  confirmation of the market  power  or 
efficiency-of-larger-firms  hypotheses.  Even after price  is used as  the 
performance variable  the  controversy  remains  because  some  argue  that higher 
prices  reflect higher quality not necessarily greater market power. 
Strategic management has  not been bothered by  these controversies  and has 
proceeded  to blend together neoclassical economics,  industrial organization, 
business  case  studies,  and behavioral  theories of the  firm  to  guide business 
decision making.  While  neoclassical  theory and  even 10 fail to  reveal  much 
about  firm behavior,  strategic management has  emphasized it.  The  traditional 
10  model  consists of a  simple  triad linking industry or market  STRUCTURE-
4 CONDUCT-PERFORMANCE.  Often,  conduct  is  i gnored.  In  contrast ,  the  strategic 
management  paradigm  focuses  on  firm  level capabilities,  strategy, 
organization,  and perf ormance  in the  context  of  the  structure,  conduct ,  and 
performance  of markets .  An  expanded 10  model  incorporating  the  insights of 
strategic  manag~ment looks  like Figure  1  (with  feedback  loops  not  shown).5 
Proponents  of strategic management  have  whole-heartedly accepted  t he  link 
between market structure,  firm strategy,  and  firm  performance.  Th e  work  of 
Porter6  at the  Harvard  Business  School  perhaps best typifies  this  appr oach  and 
demonstrates  the  importance of 10  theory and  research  to  the  firm. 
Strategic management's  emphasis  on  firm strategy and organiza t ion has 
shown  the  way  for  economic  research  to  open  the black box  that contains  market 
and  firm conduct  in neoclassical economic  theory and  the  traditional 10 
paradigm.  For ·example,  firms  decide  whether  or not  to  advertise  and  in  t ime 
such advertising,  if successful,  will create product differentiation 
which  becomes  an aspect of market structure.  Firm decisions  and  their 
outcomes  can change  market structure. 

















Performance Of  course,  market  structure still limits  the  number  of available  firm 
strategies but  those  limits  can be  challenged.  Strategies  that  seem 
inappropriate  to most  observers  of the current structure carry the highest 
risk  but if successful often yield substantial rewards.  Agricultural 
economists  have  not thought  of the poultry industry as being characterized by 
product differentiation but Frank Perdue has  advertised his  chickens  and 
created,  along with his rivals'  responses,  some  brand recognition in the  fresh 
chicken market.  Such  actions  raise  interesting research questions.  For 
example,  poultry is  inspected and  graded by  USDA  but firms  are  now  replacing 
grades with brands.  Is  such  a  change  a  more  cost effective way  of providing 
consumers  with quality assurance?  Research  that recognizes  the  important 
effects of firm decisions  on market  and  firm performance  should  improve 
understanding of our  modern  food  system. 
Another  exciting dimension of the  strategic management  paradigm is that 
it highlights  the  importance  of change.  Change  in an  industry's basic 
conditions  creates opportunities  for profit and provides  the  incentive for 
firms  to  try new  strategies.  To  gain substantial returns  the  firm must 
correctly anticipate change  and  its ultimate effects,  and  move  swiftly to 
enact its plans before  others also  see  the  opportunity.  Research needs  to 
model  how  firms  try to  anticipate,  create,  and react to  change.  For  example, 
in the  1970s  PepsiCo,  like  many  food  firms,  pursued  a  strategy of conglomerate 
diversification acquiring companies  such as  North American Van  Lines.  Now 
PepsiCo has  changed course  shedding  many  of these  acquisitions  and  seeking  to 
acquire  firms  more  closely related to  its major  lines of business.  Is this 
strategy change  in response  to  a  changing antitrust environment,  a  realization 
that pure  conglomerate diversification was  not profitable,  or both?  Adding 
6 the  richness  of firm strategic choice certainly complicates  our  theory  of  the 
firm but allows  a  much  broader  scope  of performance  i ssues  t o  b e  addressed. 
Perhaps  the  most  intractable aspect of this richness  wi l l  be  a ssessing the 
welfar e  implications  associated with models  of fir m  and  market performance 
that depart  from  the  standard neoclassical  theory. 
! 
Approaches  to  the  Study of Firm Internal Organiza t ion 
Agricultural economists  often have  a  poor understanding  of  t he  modern 
corporation and  the multitude of organizational structures  used by 
corporations  confounds  an easy remedy  to  this situation.  Wi thin  t he  f ood 
system we  see  a  vast array of corporate organizational forms- -from  small 
investor-owned  firms  to  cooperatives,  fully vertically int egrated  firms ,  and 
multinational conglomerates--and further organizational difference s  ex i s t 
within each  form.  Some  firms  continue  to use  the  traditional U-form  of 
organization which  stresses  a  functional  division of the  work  load,  while 
others have  adopted the multidivisional or M-form  approach where  f unc t ions  are 
split among  divisions  operating as  profit centers.  Why  do  f irms  chose 
particular organizational  forms  to  carry out their strategies?  Are  some 
organizational structures more  efficient for particular firms  and  does  firm 
efficiency translate into societal efficiency? 
As  the  expanded  10  model  presented in the previous  section  i ndi cates,  a 
firm's  internal organization is  the  link between  firm stra t egy  and 
performance.  A  centralized U-form  firm,  for  example,  may  be  unable  to 
speedily  implement  strategies developed in response  to  change  in a  dynamic 
marketplace .  It may  also,  more  fundamentally,  be  unable  t o  f ormulate  the 
7 necessary new  strategies.  Given  the  advantages  associated with first movers, 
speed is  a  valuable asset for  the  firm  seeking  to benefit from  changes  in the 
business  environment.  Yet,  as  Caves  and Porter's7 work  indicates ,  not all 
firms  in an  industry need  aspire to first mover  status  and different 
organizational  forms  may  b e  suited to  different strategies .  Within markets  in 
the  food  distribution system,  for  example,  there  are strategic groups  such as 
national brand and private label producers.  A  firm  that determines  that the 
private label market  is its best business  option may  want  a  functional 
internal organization that allows  for  greater cost scrutiny,  since  the  firm 
with  t he  lowest costs usually has  a  competitive  advantage  in this market 
niche.  In contrast,  a  national brand producer  may  prefer  a  multidivisional 
firm  structure  to  encourage  marketing initiatives and  new  products.  Moreover, 
there are usually even differences between firms  in the  same  strategic group. 
Internal organization not only deals with  the  firm's  internal hierarchy 
but also with  the boundary between what  is produced within the  firm  and what 
is contracted for  in markets.  Many  scholars view firms  and markets  as 
alternative means  of organizing economic  activity.  Thus  the  study of internal 
organization is central  to  the  study of vertical coordination.  Why,  for 
example,  is  the poultry  industry characterized by fully integrated firms  yet 
most  other  food  processors  avoid  investing in primary agriculture  and rely on 
contracts or markets  for  their inputs? 
There  are  two  schools  of thought  (for emphasis,  only the  extremes  are 
discussed)  on  the  driving forces  behind organizational  forms.  One  school 
views  firms  as  striving to  gain market power.  Any  new  form of organization is 
adopted  for  its market  power potential and  therefore potential for  greater 
profit.  For  example,  firms  become  conglomerates because  further horizontal 
8 acquisitions  are  foreclosed by antitrust enforcement  and because  the 
conglomerate  form  allows  them  to  engage  in business  strategies  such  as  cross-
subsidization that are unavailable  to  the  single line firm.  This  market  power 
view clearly raises public policy concerns with organizational  forms. 
The  second school of thought maintains,  as  Williamson8  states,  that  "the 
modern corporation is mainly  to  be  understood as  the product of a  series of 
organizational  innovations  that have  had  the purpose  and effect of economizing 
on transaction costs  (p.  1537)."  Under  this view  the evolution of corporate 
structures is explained by  firms  seeking  to  lower  their costs.  Firms  shifted 
from  the  U- to  the M-form  organizational  structure  to  eliminate rigid 
bureaucratic layers of management  that limited their ability to  grow  to  super 
size.  Under  the M-form  structure,  top  management  could concentrate  on 
strategic planning and act as  a  substitute capital market  internally 
redirecting capital to promising divisions.  Hence,  as  the  argument  goes, 
conglomerates  were  formed,  in part,  to  get around an  imperfect capital market. 
A  specialized and especially virulent strain of the  transaction costs 
approach  is the  agency  theory work of researchers  such  as  Fama  and Jensen. 9 
They  state that "absent fiat,  the  form  of organization that survives  in an 
activity is  the  one  that delivers  the product  demanded by  customers  at the 
lowest price while  covering costs.  This  is  the  telling dimension  on which  the 
economic  environment chooses  among  the  organizational  forms  (p.  327)."  They 
argue  that corporate structure evolves  to minimize  the  agency costs  arising 
from  tbe  fact that contracts  cannot be entirely specified,  hence  requiring 
some  sort of monitor  or enforcer.  These  researchers,  in effect,  put forth  a 
"Corporate Darwinism Theory"  in relation to organizational forms--that  which 
survives  is most efficient. 
9 In reality,  the  two  forces  driving  the  evolution of organizational  forms, 
the  seeking of market power  and efficiency,  are not mutually exclusive.  A 
firm  often gains  market  power  from  adopting  a  structural form  that  lowers  its 
transaction costs.  Moreover,  a  firm  may  pursue  a  strategy such  as vertical 
integration with the  intent of using its market power  to  extract lower 
transaction costs  from  its suppliers.  Lowering  firm  transaction costs  through 
organizational  innovation is  a  socially useful  goal  that public policy should 
encourage.  However,  a  public policy dilemma  emerges  if firms  gain market 
power  in the process.  A  similar antitrust dilemma  is well  known  regarding  the 
desire  that firms  benefit  from  all economies  of scale but not  grow  so  large 
that the market  becomes  concentrated. 
What  is missing  from  the pure  transaction costs  approach  to 
organizational  form  is  a  recognition of the corporation's ability not only  to 
adapt  to  change but also  to  influence  and  shape it through adoption of new 
strategies  and  forms  of internal organization.  In fact,  it is  a  credit to 
management  science  and  a  frustration to  the  economist's  competitive  model  that 
firms  have  continually managed  to  expand in size.  The  competitive  model 
relies  on  the  firm  facing V-shaped cost curves  that limit its expansion  and 
allow new entry.  The  eventual upturn in these  curves  is vaguely explained as 
being caused by  management's  inability to manage  ever  larger operations 
effectively.  Without V-shaped cost curves  the  economist  loses  the 
self-adjusting market  that underlies  much  of optimal  resource  allocation 
theory.  Rather  than face  the  upward portion of the  cost curve,  firms  have 
adopted  new  organizational  forms  that allow continued expansion. 
Integral to  the  issue of internal firm organization and  its motivations 
is  the  question of who  exercises control over  the  corporate hierarchy. 
10 Business  strategies are  determined by  those  who  control  the  corporation,  but 
as  research by  CaswelllO  on  the  agribusiness  sector shows,  who  controls  a 
Fortune  500  corporation is not  a  simple matter  to  determine.  The  corporate 
control  debate has  been dominated by attention to  stockholding but other 
important control  avenues  exist as  well  such  as:  holding upper  level 
management positions;  being  an  important creditor,  input supplier,  or buyer 
of finished  goods;  or holding  some  other strategic position vis-a-vis  the 
firm.  More  recently,  the  market  for  corporate control operating  through 
mergers  and  takeovers has  been proposed  as  a  more  important limit on 
management  discretion than who  exercises  internal control.  The  threat of 
takeover clearly catches  management's  attention and helps  insure against poor 
management.  It cannot prevent it, however,  because  management  and the  firm's 
existing control structure have  the  power  to  enact measures  to  insulate 
themselves  from  an  unwanted  takeover.  Passage of anti-takeover clauses,  a 
spate of leveraged buyouts  taking  firms  private,  and  the  use  of poison pills, 
white  knights,  golden parachutes  and other devices  are all evidence of this 
insulating ability. 
The  leading firms  in the  food  system are powerful  corporations  that,  to 
a  iarge extent,  shape  their  own  destiny.  Such  firms  are not likely to 
disappear by  their own mistakes.  The  operation of their internal 
organizations determines  firm  and,  ultimately,  market  performance.  Economic 
research is needed  to  explore  the black box of firm behavior  in order  to 
assess  the balance of gains  in market  power,  firm  efficiency,  and societal 
efficiency  from  organizational  innovation. 
11 Research  Directions 
Involving  economists  in strategic management  and  firm  internal 
organization research  should prove  useful  in two  ways.  First,  the  research 
should assist business  managers  in their decision making.  For  example,  a 
group  of blueberry growers  may  be  considering forming  a  marketing cooperative. 
What  development  and  organizational strategy makes  the  most  sense?  How  should 
the  tobacco  industry adjust to  decreasing domestic  cigarette sales?  Research 
cannot provide certain  answers  to  such questions but it can offer reasoned 
advice. 
Second,  economists  are well-trained to  conduct  research that provides  an 
assessment of  the  overall economic  performance  of various  strategic approaches 
and organizational structures with an eye  toward making public policy 
recommendations.  For  example,  what  restrictions,  if any,  should be  placed on 
the operation of  the  market  for  corporate control?  Does  the current system 
have  a  self-adjusting,  corrective mechanism much  like that of  the  competitive 
model?  Will  corporate  raiders,  leveraged buyout specialists,  labor markets 
for  top  managers,  and  other private institutions and actions  adequately 
monitor  the  overall performance of our  economic  system? 
Economists  who  venture  into  the  areas  of strategic management  and 
internal organizational  forms  should be  rewarded by  addressing  issues of 
pressing  importance  to both  firms  and society. 
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